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The  modern  payments  system  is  a  complex  set 
of  arrangements  involving  such  diverse  institutions 
as currency,  the  banking  system,  clearinghouses,  the 
central  bank,  and  government  deposit  insurance. 
While  there  is an enormous  literature  about  its con- 
stituent  parts,  there  is  little  unifying  analysis. 
Monetary  economists  have  long  pursued  deeper 
understanding  of  currency  as  the  medium  of  ex- 
change.  But  they  have  generally  ignored  the  bank- 
ing  system  and  clearinghouses,  even  when  focusing 
on  monetary  policy.  Financial  economists,  on  the 
other  hand,  have  been  keenly  interested  in banks  as 
financial  intermediaries  and  in  government  deposit 
insurance.  But,  by  and  large,  they  have  ignored  the 
payments  system  aspects  of  these  institutions;  and 
they  have  tended  to  treat  medium  of exchange  and 
monetary  policy  issues  only  peripherally. 
To  fully understand  the  payments  system,  though, 
including  the  evolution  and  structure  of  its  con- 
stituent  institutions,  it is necessary  to appreciate  both 
its  monetary  and  financial  aspects.  This  paper 
presents  a  unified  treatment  by  showing  how  the 
evolution  of  the  payments  system  has  been  driven 
by  efficiency  gains  from  substituting  credit,  i.e., 
claims  on  particular  institutions,  for  commodity 
money.  The  discussion  emphasizes  that  the  substitu- 
tion  of credit  for commodity  money  was accompanied 
by  arrangements  to  monitor  and  enforce  restrictions 
on  credit-issuing  institutions.  Among  other  things, 
it suggests  alternative  answers  to  some  long-standing 
questions  about  banking.  For  example,  it  suggests 
why  payments  services  and  information-intensive 
lending  have  been  provided  jointly  by  the  same  set 
of  institutions,  i.e.,  banks;  and  it  explains  why 
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maintaining  the  value  of bank  deposits  at par has been 
efficient,  i.e.,  why  banks  have  not  been  set  up  as 
mutual  funds. 
Insights  developed  by  explaining  the  private 
payments  system  are  subsequently  employed  to 
evaluate  public  payments  system  policy.  I focus  on 
the  need  for  public  protection  of  the  payments 
system.  One  can  imagine  a payments  system  not  in 
need  of protection;  namely,  one  using  only  govern- 
ment  currency  or coin,  i.e.,  cash,  and perhaps  a postal 
money-order  system.  However,  the  public  has  ap- 
parently  been  willing  to  accept  some  credit  risk  for 
the  substantial  efficiency  gains  that  the  use  of credit 
instruments  in  place  of  cash  has  afforded.  The 
public’s willingness  to  accept  purely  private  measures 
for controlling  credit  risk prior  to the  Federal  Reserve 
and  government  deposit  insurance  indicates  that 
private  protection  of the  payments  system  was largely 
effective. 
I  explore  whether  the  development  of  the  pay- 
ments  system  by  private  decentralized  competitive 
forces  was  deficient,  however,  by  evaluating  three 
prominent  public  payments  system  policies:  mone- 
tary  policy,  central  bank  lending,  and  deposit 
insurance.  Briefly,  although  valuing  deposits  at  par 
and  holding  fractional  reserves  is efficient  for  indi- 
vidual  banks,  it  has  the  potential  for  generating 
destabilizing  systemwide  bank  runs  that  can  be 
remedied  most  efficiently  by  central  bank  monetary 
policy.  In  contrast  to  monetary  policy,  fully  col- 
lateralized  discount  window  lending  as practiced  by 
the  Federal  Reserve  matters  only  because  the  rules 
for  pledging  bank  assets  favor  the  Federal  Reserve 
over  private  lenders.  The  provision  of  payments 
finality  by  private  clearinghouses  prior  to  the 
establishment  of  the  Federal  Reserve,  however, 
suggests  that  some  Fed  lending  in  the  process  of 
making  payments  may  be  efficient.  Moreover,  it also 
suggests  that  Fed  limits  on  direct  access  to  the 
payments  system  are  also  efficient,  both  to  protect 
Fed  lending  and  to  protect  the  interbank  credit 
market. 
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ticed  by the Fed,  deposit  insurance  is a liability whose 
potential  cost  bank  managers  can  increase  by  their 
choice  of assets.  Hence,  deposit  insurance  must  be 
supported  by  extensive  supervision  and  regulation 
to protect  the  insurer’s  funds.  My  discussion  points 
out  some  pitfalls  of current  protective  provisions.  It 
then  uses  insights  developed  in  the  discussion  of 
private  payments  arrangements  to  suggest  a tough 
exclusion  principle  as  a  potential  remedy,  and  to 
critique  an  alternative  proposal,  narrow  banking. 
The  plan  of  the  paper  is  as  follows.  Section  I 
outlines  the  fundamental  efficiencies  of monetized 
exchange.  Section  II discusses  the  basic  benefits  and 
costs  of  substituting  credit  for  commodity  money. 
Section  III  treats  the  role  of banks  in the  payments 
system,  suggesting  how  the  four  characteristic 
features  distinguishing  banks  from  other  financial 
intermediaries  flow  from  the  role  of  banks  in  pro- 
viding  efficient  medium  of. exchange  services.  Sec- 
tion  IV  explains  further  efficiencies  made  possible 
by  the  development  of private  multilateral  arrange- 
ments  among  banks.  It  considers  two  historically 
important  examples:  The  Suffolk  Bank  System  and 
check  clearinghouses.  Section  V evaluates  the  three 
public  payments  system  policies  mentioned  above. 
I. 
THEMEDIUMOFEXCHANGE 
As  the  medium  of  exchange,  money  overcomes 
inconveniences  associated  with  barter,  most  notably 
the  double  coincidence  of  wants  and  commodity 
indivisibilities.’  Money  also  naturally  serves  as  the 
medium  of account.  Having  high  purchasing  power 
to  weight,  money  economizes  on  the  cost  of carry- 
ing  or  transporting  assets  to  make  payments. 
Equally  important,  money  is  .easily  recognized, 
saving  costly  verification  of its authenticity  and value. 
Needless  to  say,  money  must  also  be  a reasonably 
durable  store  of  value. 
In  the  early  hunting  societies  skins  served  as 
money.2  Such  items  as corn,  tobacco,  and  olive  oil 
served  as money  in agricultural  societies.  Of course, 
the  precious  metals  silver  and  gold  emerged  as the 
most  widely  used  commodity  monies  in the  modern 
world.  Their  great  value  in  nonmonetary  uses, 
e.g.,  for ornamentation  and jewelry,  has given  them 
considerable  purchasing  power  portability.  When 
properly  alloyed,  their  durability  is  also  very  high. 
Both  metals  are readily divisible,  though  silver’s lower 
purchasing  power  to  weight  has  made  it more  con- 
venient  than  gold  for  fractional  coinage.  And  both 
metals  are easily recognizable.  Beyond  their  color and 
metallic  ring,  simple  tests,  e.g.,  specific  gravity  and 
acid  tests  for  gold,  identify  them  cheaply.  Their 
coinability  has  made  possible  a  further  economi- 
zation  of verification  costs  in everyday  exchange.  A 
coin  stamp  certifies  the  original  weight  and fineness 
of the  metal  and,  along  with  milling  on  the  edges, 
makes  evident  any  subsequent  alteration. 
The  exclusive  use  of  commodity  money  in 
making  payments  would  mean  that  each  transfer  of 
goods  was accompanied  simultaneously  by a transfer 
from  the  buyer  to  the  seller  of  a  quantity  of  com- 
modity  money  of equal value.  From  the  modern  point 
of  view,  making  payments  exclusively  with  com- 
modity  money  seems  highly  restrictive.  Yet if it were 
impossible  to  judge  or  guarantee  individual  relia- 
bility,  e.g.,  if  individual  identities  were  private 
information,  other  arrangements  for making  payments 
would  be  infeasible.3  Settlement  in paper  claims’on 
real  assets  would  be  ruled  out  because  their  value 
could  not  be verified.  Likewise,  individuals  could  not 
credibly  precommit  to  settle  in  the  commodity 
money  itself,  even  in the  near  future.  Since  precom- 
mitment  would  not  be  enforceable,  deferred  settle- 
ment  would  not  be  feasible.4  Though  it  has  been 
possible,  of course,  to  develop  systems  for  enforc- 
ing settlement  in terms  of paper  claims or even  book- 
entry  claims,  it is costly  to manage  them  efficiently. 
Hence,  it has remained  efficient  for society  to finance 
the  majority  of its transactions  with cash,  i.e.,  govern- 
ment  currency  and  coin.5 
The  need  to  employ  cash  gives  rise  to  an  inven- 
tory  demand  for  it.  The  reason  is  that  the  cost  of 
using  cash  is minimized  by keeping  an inventory  on 
hand  and  replenishing  it  only  infrequently.  The 
average  efficient  cash  inventory,  i.e.,  the  demand  for 
cash,  is smaller  the  lower  is the  replenishment  cost. 
In addition,  the  efficient  stock  demand  is lower  the 
greater  is the  opportunity  cost  of holding  it, i.e.,  the 
higher  is the  nominal  rate .of interest.  It is, of course, 
the  real  value  of cash  demanded  that  is determined 
according  to the  above  considerations.  Other  things 
the  same,  the  nominal  demand  for cash  moves  pro- 
portionally  with  the  price  level.  The  real  demand, 
of course,  is related  to the  real flow of cash purchases. 
II. 
CREDITINTHE,EXCHANGEPROCESS 
As a commodity,  paper  has  all the  attributes  of an 
efficient  medium  of exchange,  except  one.  Paper  is 
highly  divisible  and  portable,  and  it  can  be  made 
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ing  power  to  weight  ratio  is far too  low  for  it to  be 
an  efficient  pure  commodity  money.  However,  if 
there  is a technologically  feasible  means  of informa- 
tion  production  and  a  means  of  enforcement  that 
allows verification  of the  value  of paper  claims on real 
assets,  then  it becomes  efficient for paper  claims,  i.e., 
warehouse  receipts,  to  circulate  in  place  of  com- 
modity  money  itself.6 The  efficiency  stems  from  the 
fact  that  the  purchasing  power  to  weight  of  paper 
claims  exceeds  that  for commodity  money.  In addi- 
tion,  leaving  commodity  money  in a central  location 
yields  economies  of scale  in storage.  These  factors, 
in  turn,  reduce  the  cost  of  replenishing  money 
balances,  now  paper  claims,  and  thereby  reduce  the 
efficient  inventory  of money  to have  on hand.  At the 
social level the  reduced  stock  demand  for money  pro- 
vides  a benefit  by  freeing  some  of the  money  com- 
modity  for  nonmonetary  uses. 
The  abovementioned  efficiencies  are purchased  at 
the  cost  of maintaining  systems  for  monitoring  and 
enforcement  of the  promise  to honor  the  warehouse 
receipts.  To  understand  the  nature  of these  costs  it 
is useful  to  view  the  leaving  of  commodity  money 
at a warehouse  as lending.7  The  receipt,  entitling  its 
holder  to reclaim  the  commodity  money  on demand, 
may  be  viewed  as  evidence  of  commodity  money 
credit  extended  to  the  warehouse.  Because  the  cir- 
culation  of warehouse  receipts  in place  of commod- 
ity money  itself involves  lending,  it must  be  accom- 
panied  by rules  and restrictions  to protect  the  lender 
(claim  check  holder)  against  the  possibility  that  the 
borrower  (warehouse)  will not  repay  the  loan,  i.e., 
that  the  warehouse  will not  honor  its  claim  checks. 
Efficient  loan design  involves  the  costly  accumula- 
tion  of  detailed  information  about  borrowers.  To 
economize  on the  expense  of acquiring  information, 
lending  is typically  undertaken  in the  context  of long- 
term  relationships.  In addition  to establishing  the  bor- 
rower’s  reliability,  there  is usually  an  agreement  to 
restrict  the  borrower’s  range  of actions  to reduce  the 
risk  of  default.  Typically  the  borrower  agrees  to 
collateralize  the  loan.  That  is, the  borrower  accepts 
a set  of restrictions  on the  use  or transfer  of an asset 
designated  as security.  In order  to enforce  compliance 
with  such  restrictions,  loan  agreements  contain  pro- 
visions  for  the  lender  to  monitor  the  borrower.8 
Warehouse  receipts,  like  claim  checks  for  laun- 
dries,  entitle  the  holder  to  reclaim  the  exact  items 
left there.  Moreover,  such  claims restrict  their  issuers 
from  using  or renting  the  items.  In effect,  then,  com- 
modity  monies  left with a warehouse,  i.e.,  commodity 
money  loans  to  the  warehouse,  are  perfectly  col- 
lateralized.  They  would  be  safe  so long  as someone 
representing  the  borrowers  monitored  the warehouse. 
Note  .that  even  though  each  unit  of  commodity 
money  in storage,  in effect,  collateralized  a specific 
claim  check,  the  claim  checks  could  circulate  inter- 
changeably  if the  commodity  money  collateral  were 
homogeneous.  They  would,  however,  have  to  be 
transferable.  But  this  could  be  arranged  either  by 
allowing  an initial depositor  to endorse  his claim over 
to  another,  or  by  having  the  claim  simply  promise 
to  pay  the  presenter. 
Because  foolproof  monitoring  of  the  warehouse 
would  be  very  costly,  it  would  be  useful  to  put  in 
place  other  safeguards  to protect  the  loan  collateral, 
i.e.,  the warehoused  commodity  money.9  An efficient 
means  of  doing  so  would  .be  for  a wealthy  man  of 
long-standing  reputation  in the  community  to run the 
warehouse.  Default  would  be  known  to be costly  for 
such  a man  in terms  of reputational  capital.  Equally 
important,  he  could  pledge  fiied  property  to further 
collateralize  the  loans  in case  of a misappropriation 
of the  commodity  money.  In  effect,  he  would  pro- 
vide capital to protect  the customers  of the warehouse 
against  loss. 
All the  costs  of running  the  warehouse,  including 
rent  for the  building,  management  fees,  the  cost  of 
printing  warehouse  receipts,  fees  for monitoring  and 
enforcing  protective  restrictions,  and  a return  to the 
owner  for putting  up capital,  would  be built  into  the 
warehouse  storage  charge.  If these  costs were  smaller 
than  the  benefits  discussed  above  of using warehouse 
receipts  as the  circulating  medium,  then  it would  be 
more  efficient for paper  claims on commodity  money 
to  circulate  in place  of commodity  money  itself.  Of 
course,  a gain  might  only  obtain  for  some  transac- 
tions.  If a warehouse  were  only  known  locally,  for 
example,  then  commodity  money  would  still  be 
used  for  traveling. 
In fact,  the  evolution  of the  payments  system  has 
been,  in large  part,  driven  by  efficiency  gains  from 
substituting  credit,  i.e.,  claims  on  particular  insti- 
tutions,  for commodity  money.  The  substitution  of 
warehouse  receipts  for commodity  money  was  only 
the  first  in  a series  of  substitutions  that  have  been 
found  to  be  efficient.  For  reasons  that  will  be  dis- 
cussed  below,  warehousing  developed  into  banking 
relatively  quickly.  ,But  the  discussion  of warehous- 
ing was  conceptually  valuable  because  it makes  par- 
ticularly  clear  the  efficiency  gains  as well as the  costs 
incurred  in  substituting  credit  for  circulating  com- 
modity  money.  To  reiterate,  such  substitution  has 
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tions  on and  monitoring  institutions  that  issue  credit 
money  have  been  less  than  the  cost  of using  com- 
modity  money  directly.  In other  words,  the  drive  for 
greater  efficiency,  which  has  dictated  a continuing 
substitution  of  credit  for  commodity  money  in 
making  payments,  has brought  with it a need  to make 
arrangements  to  protect  the  payments  system. 
III. 
THEROLEOFBANKS 
Banks  have  been  distinguished  from  other  finan- 
cial  intermediaries  by  the  following  four  character- 
istics.  First,  prior  to the  nationalization  of currency, 
banks  issued  liabilities  in  the  form  of  circulating 
banknotes.  Second,  bank  deposits  have  normally 
been  valued  at  par  in  terms  of  currency.iO  Third, 
banks  have  provided  checking  services  for  their 
depositors.  Fourth,  banks  have  specialized  in 
information-intensive  lending.”  That  is,  a  large 
portion  of  bank’assets  have  been  loans  which  are 
not  traded  on  secondary  markets,  and  hence  must 
be  valued  and  managed  entirely  by  individual  banks 
themselves.12  A  long-standing  puzzle  in  under- 
standing  banking  is  why  payments  services  and 
information-intensive  lending  have  both  been  offered 
by the  same  set  of institutions,  namely,  banks.  This 
section  explains  the  mix  of  services  distinguishing 
banking  from  other  financial  intermediation  as  an 
efficient  outcome  of a further  substitution  of credit 
for  commodity  money  in  the  payments  system. 
Once  the  commodity  money  warehouses  described 
above  were  set  up,  there  was  relatively  little  need 
for circulating  claims  to  be  cashed  in.  Claims  might 
be  made  for travel,  for payments  to distant  locations 
where  the  warehouse  was  unknown,  in response  to 
changes  in the  nonmonetary  demand  for the  money 
commodity,  or  in  response  to  changes  in  com- 
modity  money  demand  itself.  But for  the  most  part 
claims  could  simply  circulate,  the  average  inventory 
per  person  being  determined  efficiently  as outlined 
above.  Claims  could  retain  their  value  indefinitely, 
with  systems  in place  to  monitor  and  safeguard  the 
commodity  money  collateral  in  the  warehouse. 
The  payments  system  ‘could  be  run  even  more 
economically,  however,  if  the  warehoused  com- 
modity  money  wereinvested  at interest,  leaving  just 
enough  to  manage  efficiently  any  claims  that  might 
be  made.  Keeping  too  small  an  inventory  of  com- 
modity  money  would  lead  to  excessively  costly 
stockouts.  Too  large  an  inventory  would  be  costly 
in terms  of interest  income  foregone.  Hence,  a frac- 
tional  reserve  of commodity  money  was  optimal.  At 
the  individual  level,  interest  earnings  could  defray 
some  of the  fee for leaving  commodity  money  at the 
warehouse.  If large  enough,  they  could  provide  net 
interest  to  claim  check  holders.  The  social  value 
of  fractional  reserves  was  to  free  the  money  corn: 
modity  for  nonmonetary  uses.  By  reducing  the 
opportunity  cost  of money,  i.e.,  lowering  the  implicit 
rental  rate  on  money,  fractional  reserves  also  raised 
the  efficient  stock  demand  for  money  and  reduced 
the  cost  of managing  money  balances. 
The  efficiency  gains  of  fractional  reserves  could 
not  be had,  however,  without  changing  the  character 
of the  warehouse  claim  check.  As discussed  above, 
a conventional  warehouse  receipt  specifies  a perfect 
collateral  interest  in  the  particular  units  of  com- 
modity  money  left in a warehouse,  implicitly  restrict- 
ing  the  warehouse  to  hold  100  percent  reserves  of 
commodity  money,  or getting  permission  from  the 
specific  customer  who  owns  the  collateral  every  time 
it is moved  around.  Hence,  to get the  efficiency  gains 
of fractional  reserve  banking,  depositors  had  to give 
up  perfected  collateral  interest  and  become  general 
creditors.r3  This  point  about  the  character  of  the 
deposit  contract  will  be  important  below  when  I 
evaluate  Federal  Reserve  discount  window  lending. 
A bank  free  to invest  in interest-earning  assets  but 
without  any expertise  in information-intensive  lend- 
ing  would  lend  on  the  basis  of  easily  verified  safe 
collateral,  that  is,  on  real  bills;  or  it  could  lend  to 
entities  well-known  to have  good  credit,  such  as blue- 
chip  firms  or governments.  Being  based  on publicly 
available  information,  such  loans  could  take  the  form 
of traded  securities.  So although  the  incentive  to hold 
fractional  reserves  explains  why  commodity  money 
warehouses  evolved  into  financial  intermediaries,  it 
does  not  explain  the  emergence  of other  distinctive 
features  of  banking,  in  particular,  information- 
intensive  lending.  The  following  argument,  however, 
suggests  such  an  explanation. 
Having  developed  arrangements  to  support  the 
efficient  issue  of  notes,  banks  were  positioned  to 
further  economize  on  the  use  of resources  in  mak- 
ing  payments:  they  could  offer  checkable  deposits 
and  check  collection  services.  Checks  allowed  indi- 
viduals  to  make  payments  in person  without  carry- 
ing  currency.14  Because  checkable  deposits  pro- 
vided  banks  with  loanable  funds,  they  could  pay  a 
competitive  return  either  as  explicit  interest  or  by 
defraying  the  cost  of  check-clearing  services.  Of 
course  banknotes  likewise  represented  a source  of 
10  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  JANUARY/FEBRUARY  1991 loanable  funds  for banks  and  could,  in principle,  pay 
interest  to  their  owner  periodically.  Such  interest 
payments,  however,  would  cause  the  value  of notes 
to rise  as the  interest  payment  date  approached  and 
to  fall  sharply  immediately  after.  Moreoker,  their 
value  would  fluctuate  with  the  nominal  interest  rate 
that  converts  the  future  interest  payment  into  a 
present  value.  Individuals  using  currency  would 
thereby  have  to agree  on its value before  an exchange 
could  take  place.  Such  inconveniences  have  appar- 
ently  made  it inefficient  to pay  interest  on currency. 
Hence,  the  primary  efficiency  gain  made  possible 
by checks  was  to allow society,  in part,  to substitute 
interest-earning  checkable  deposits  for non-interest- 
earning  currency.  In addition,  checks  made  payments 
through  the  mail more  convenient  and reliable.  A fur- 
ther  saving  was  achieved  because  checks  could  be 
deposited  directly  and  collected  in bulk  through  the 
banking  system. 
With  no  further  arrangements  among  banks, 
checks  would  require  immediate  payment  in  com- 
modity  money  when  received  by  the  paying  bank. 
Once  again,  however,  an  efficiency  gain  was 
achieved  by  using  credit  in  place  of  immediate 
settlement  in  commodity  money,  this  time  in  the 
form  of interbank  balances.  In general,  checks  sent 
for  collection  from  one  bank  to  another  tend  to  net 
out,  so  if  payment  were  always  made  as  checks 
were  received,  commodity  money  would  simply  be 
shipped  back  and  forth  with  neither  bank  accumu- 
lating  or decumulating  any on average.  Banks  could, 
therefore,  economize  on  such  shipping  costs  by 
simply  holding  credit  balances  on each  other  instead 
of  requiring  immediate  settlement  in  commodity 
money.  For  example,  instead  of triggering  immediate 
shipment  of commodity  money  from bank  A to bank 
B,  checks  sent  for  payment  by  bank  B to  bank  A 
could  result  in bank  A giving  bank  B a deposit.  Bank 
B would  then  be  said  to  have  an  interbank  deposit 
at  bank  A.  When  the  flow  of collections  reversed, 
bank  A  could  acquire  a  deposit  at  bank  B.  To 
economize  on  commodity  money  shipping  costs, 
banks  agreed  to make  temporary  loans  to each  other 
on  demand  as  dictated  by  developments  in  the 
payments  system.15 
Just  as noteholders  made  arrangements  to protect 
commodity  money  deposited  with  more  primitive 
banks,  banks  employing  interbank  balances 
developed  systems  and  expertise  in monitoring  and 
managing  loans to each other.  In contrast  to individual 
depositors  with  relatively  small  deposits  at  a single 
bank,  banks  themselves  needed  numerous  interbank 
relationships  to provide  efficient  payments  services 
to their customers.  Moreover,  such relationships  were 
geographically  spread  out.  In  addition,  payments 
system  efficiency  dictated  that  banks  grant  possibly 
large  loans,  by  accepting  balances  at  another  bank, 
on  very  short  notice,  without  the  safety  of specific 
collateral.  In  effect,  banks  offered  lines  of credit  to 
their  correspondent  banks.  Hence,  banks  had  to be 
particularly  careful  about  the  correspondents  through 
which  they  collected  checks.  Equally  important,  they 
had  to  devote  resources  to  continually  evaluate  the 
creditworthiness  of  those  banks  with  which  they 
chose  to have  collection  relationships.  In other  words, 
banks  specialized  in information-intensive  lending  to 
support  efficient  payments  services  for  their 
customers. 
There  are two  important  implications  of this point. 
First,  because  banks  had an incentive  to monitor  each 
other  in the  process  of collecting  checks,  they  could 
provide  an economical  indirect  means  for a depositor 
to  monitor  his  own  bank.  A depositor  could  check 
what  interbank  collection  relationships  his bank  could 
arrange.  Since  good  banks  had  an  incentive  to 
publicize  such  arrangements,  depositors  would  have 
little  trouble  monitoring  interbank  relationships.  A 
substantial  number  of relationship  terminations  would 
be  taken  as  evidence  that  a  particular  bank  had 
become  a bad  credit  risk.  Depriving  a weak  bank  of 
the  ability  to have  its checks  accepted  for collection 
at  other  banks  would  also  greatly  reduce  its  ability 
to  successfully  market  checkable  deposits.  Alter- 
natively,  banks  might  continue  to  accept  for collec- 
tion  checks  drawn  on  a bank  perceived  to  be  a bad 
credit  risk,  but  announce  that  they  would  no  longer 
hold  deposits  at the weak  bank.  Though  it could  still 
have  its  checks  collected  by  other  banks,  the  weak 
bank  would  be  forced  to  hold  larger  cash  reserves 
to manage  its checkable  deposits,  forcing  it to be less 
competitive  in  that  respect. 
Second,  the  holding  of interbank  deposits  rather 
than  publicly traded  securities  by banks  made  it much 
more  difficult  for  depositors  to  continually  evaluate 
bank  solvency.  This  led  banks  to  devote  more 
resources  to  monitoring  each  other  and  reinforced 
the  need  for  additional  safeguards,  such  as  more 
capital.r6 
I am finally in a position  to suggest  why  payments 
services  and  information-intensive  loans  to nonfinan- 
cial firms  have  been  provided  jointly  by the  same  set 
of institutions,  i.e.,  banks.  Imagine  a set  of finance 
companies  satisfying  the  nonfinancial  demand  for 
information-intensive  loans.  They  would  develop  the 
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their  loans.  Moreover,  one would  expect  such finance 
companies  to  organize  a network  to  allocate  credit 
to  the  best  prospects,  and  to  help  diversify  their 
loan  portfolios.  Intercompany  balances  would  be 
managed  with  the  same  systems  used  to  manage 
information-intensive  loans to nonfinancial  borrowers. 
Intercompany  borrowing  and  lending  would  exist 
even  if  finance  companies  offered  no  payments 
services. 
Now,  one  can  imagine  a  separate  network  of 
mutual  funds  offering  payments  services.  Would  it 
be  efficient  for the  finance  and payments  companies 
to exist independently?  It would  not seem  so. Finance 
companies  would  have  in place  much  of the  network, 
systems,  and  expertise  to  run  a  reliable  and  effi- 
cient  payments  system.  They  would  merely  need  to 
accept  demand  deposits  and  set  up  facilities  for 
handling  payments  flows.  The  point  is that  systems 
to  evaluate  credit,  monitor  and  enforce  loan 
agreements,  and  extend  credit  on  short  notice  are 
productive  both  in originating  loans  to  nonfinancial 
borrowers  and  in  managing  lending  to  support  an 
efficient  provision  of payments  services.  This,  1 am 
arguing,  helps  explain  why  institutions  specializing 
in  information-intensive  lending,  i.e.,  banks,  have 
applied  their  expertise  jointly  to  the  production  of 
payments  services  and  nontraded  loans. 
Moreover,  nonfinancial  lines of credit  involve  long- 
term  relationships  in which  the  finance  company  and 
the  borrower  each  have  an  incentive  to  assure  that 
the  other  has  staying  power.  A finance  company  re- 
quires  information  about  a borrower.  But a borrower 
who  pays  an  ongoing  fee  for  his  credit  line  likewise 
needs  assurances  of  his  finance  company’s  staying 
power.  Other  things  the  same,  then,  finance  com- 
panies  will offer checkable  deposits  more  efficiently 
than  pure  payments  companies,  because  potential 
depositors  will  already  have  acquired  information 
about  the  reliability  of  finance  companies  as 
depositories.  Independent  payments  companies 
could,  of course,  assure  their  reliability  by  holding 
publicly  traded  securities;  but  the  low cost  of verify- 
ing the  value  of traded  securities  would  be  reflected 
in a yield  below  that  on  nontraded  loans.  I am  sug- 
gesting  that,  on  net,  using  the  same  information  to 
assure  the  reliability  of both  credit  lines  and  deposits 
allows payments  services  to be provided  at lower cost 
by  firms  also  offering  line  of  credit  services. 
The  joint  product  efficiencies  of  combining 
information-intensive  lending  with  the  provision  of 
payments  services  also  explains  why  bank  deposits 
have  been  valued  at  par,  i.e.,  why  banks  have  not 
been  set  up  as mutual  funds.  Of  course,  practically 
speaking  this  would  have  required  banks  to  hold 
securities  valued  continually  in  the  market.  Yet 
restricting  assets  this  way would  certainly  have  been 
feasible,  especially  in  modern  times,  and  it  would 
have  made  banks  easier  to  monitor.  As  Fama  and 
Jensen  [1983,  pp.  337-410)  point  out,  however, 
institutions  specializing  in  nontraded  loans  are  not 
run  efficiently  as  mutual  funds.  The  incentive  for 
such  institutions  to employ  par value  deposits,  whose 
yield  is independent  of the  fortunes  of the  firm,  may 
be  understood  as part  of a widespread  use  of bonds 
together  with  equity  in  the  financing  of  firms  in 
general.  Jensen  and  Meckling  (19761  have  empha- 
sized  that  from  the  point  of view  of claimants,  bonds 
are  an optimal  part  of a financial  package  to monitor 
management  and ensure  an efficient  choice  of assets. 
In other  words,  bank  deposits  have  been  par  valued 
because  it has  been  efficient  for  banks  to  use  them 
to  fund  nontraded  loans.” 
IV. 
THE PAYMENTS SYSTEM 
To  this  point,  1 have  discussed  efficiencies  in the 
means  of  making  payments  that  involved  bilateral 
relationships  among  banks.  Here  1 discuss  further 
efficiencies  made  possible  by  the  development  of 
private  multilateral  cooperative  arrangements.  1 
consider  two  historically  important  examples:  the 
Suffolk  Bank  System  and  the  clearinghouses.  The 
Suffolk  System  emerged  as  a more  efficient  means 
of  redeeming  banknotes.  The  clearinghouses 
economized  on  the  collection  of  checks. 
The  Suffolk Bank  System 
The  Suffolk Bank  System  arose  in early nineteenth 
century  New  England.  I8 At that  time,  country  bank- 
notes  made  up  the  bulk  of  the  regional  circulating 
currency,  although  residents  of Boston  also used  local 
checkable  bank  deposits  to  make  payments.  As 
pointed  out  above,  normally  there  would  be  little 
reason  for  banknotes  to  be  redeemed.  In  the  pro- 
cess  of circulating,  however,  banknotes  could  flow 
some  distance  from  the  banks  that  issued  them. 
During  this  period  the  balance  of payments  within 
the  region  favored  Boston,  and  country  banknotes 
generally  flowed  in  that  direction. 
Because  banknotes  entitled  the  holder  to  com- 
modity  money  (by  this  time,  gold  or  silver  coin)  at 
their  issuing  bank  only,  notes  bore  ever-greater  dis- 
counts  in terms  of coin the  farther  they  traveled  from 
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transport  and  time  costs  of  carrying  the  notes  to 
the  bank  for  payment  and  returning  with  the  coin. 
If information  on  creditworthiness  were  difficult  to 
obtain  at a distance  or if solvency  were  in doubt,  the 
discount  could  include  a risk  premium.  The  cost  of 
authenticating  notes  to detect  counterfeits  increased 
the  discount  even  further. 
Under  such  conditions,  it  became  profitable  for 
individuals  known  as notebrokers  to buy  notes  with 
coin in Boston  and return  them  to their  banks  of issue 
for  payment.  By  buying  up  and  returning  notes  in 
bulk,  notebrokers  could reduce  the per item  transport 
cost.  Competition  among  notebrokers  thereby  re- 
duced  the  discounts  on country  banknotes  in Boston. 
Carrying  potentially  large  positions  in notes  of par- 
ticular  banks,  brokers  also had incentive  to specialize 
in  authenticating  notes  and  evaluating  bank  credit 
risk.  The  economization  on information  production 
achieved  by  brokers  probably  also  reduced  the  risk 
premium  on  notes. 
Of course,  competition  would  remove  any  abnor- 
mal arbitrage  profit,  as brokers  bid the  discount  down 
to the point  where  it just  covered  the  cost  of redemp- 
tion.  In  effect,  notebrokering  forced  the  country 
banks  and  the  rural  areas  as a whole  to finance  their 
balance  of payments  deficit vis-a-vis Boston  with coin 
instead  of with  paper  credit,  i.e.,  banknotes.  Coun- 
try  banks  and  their  customers  deplored  notebroker- 
ing  because  it forced  banks  to  call in loans  in order 
to  accumulate  coin  which  then  went  to  Boston. 
It was  in this  environment  that  the  Suffolk  Bank 
System  was  organized.  The  Suffolk  System  was  an 
arrangement  by  which  the  Suffolk  Bank  in  Boston 
redeemed  a  country  bank’s  notes  with  coin,  pro- 
vided  that  the  country  bank  deposited  coin  at  the 
Suffolk  Bank  to  cover  the  redemption.  Initially,  the 
System  was  set  up  on  a purely  bilateral  basis  and 
amounted  to little more  than  centralized  notebroker- 
ing  with  further  economies  of  scale.  Since  country 
banks  had  to  redeem  their  notes  as  before,  the 
Suffolk  System  was  likewise  unpopular  outside  of 
Boston.  But  because  the  Suffolk  Bank  redeemed 
notes  at a discount  while nonmembers  had to redeem 
theirs  at par,  country  banks  were  given  an incentive 
to  participate. 
After  a while,  the  Suffolk System  introduced  a kind 
of  collective  net  settlement,  an important  multilateral 
clearing  procedure  that  was  a precursor  to that  used 
in  clearinghouses.  l9  To  make  this  possible,  the 
Suffolk  Bank  ruled  that  it would  accept,  as required 
deposits,  the  notes  of any participating  banks  in good 
standing.  This  ruling  allowed  a bank  to  redeem  its 
notes  by  swapping  them  for  excess  coin  in another 
account.  In effect,  the  procedure  allowed  interbank 
borrowing,  which  made  more  efficient  use  of  coin 
on deposit,  and reduced  the  average  inventory  of coin 
that  each  bank  had  to keep  on  hand.  Collective  net 
settlement  should  be  recognized  as  yet  another 
example  of the  substitution  of credit  for  the  use  of 
commodity  money  in  the  payments  system.  As  in 
the  earlier  examples,  the  innovative  use of credit  was 
due  to the  saving  it afforded  in reduced  commodity 
money  shipping  costs  and smaller  commodity  money 
reserves.  Here  too  the  use  of credit  was  supported 
by  extensive  safeguards  on  all the  participants,  in- 
cluding  the  Suffolk  Bank  itself,  and  especially  by 
continual  monitoring  of  the  country  banks  by  the 
Suffolk  Bank.  One  important  control  was the  power 
to expel  a bank  judged  to be  excessively  weak  from 
the  system. 
The  Clearinghouses 
Clearinghouses  emerged  in  various  cities  around 
the  United  States  in  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth 
century  as private  cooperative  arrangements  among 
banks  to  economize  on  check  collection.20  In part, 
clearinghouses  did for check  collecting  what  the  Suf- 
folk Bank  System  did for the  payment  of coin against 
notes.21 The  most  well-known  clearinghouse  innova- 
tion  was  the  replacement  of bilateral  collection  pro- 
cedures  with  collective  net  settlement.  Each  morn- 
ing,  clearinghouse  member  banks  took  checks  to  a 
central  house  for  clearing.  There  the  checks  were 
netted  out or offset against  each  other  and a net  credit 
or debit  position  against “the clearinghouse”  was com- 
puted  for each  member  bank.  Later  in the  day,  banks 
covered  any net  debit  positions  with government  cur- 
rency  or  coin.  Funds  so  received  paid  off the  net 
creditor  banks  from  that  morning’s  clearing. 
The  basic  efficiency  gains  were  these.  Instead  of 
making  collections  individually,  each  bank  could take 
its checks  to a central  location  for collection.  Thus, 
centralized  collection  itself  saved  significantly  on 
transport  costs.  Netting  out  provided  an  additional 
saving  by  greatly  reducing  the  volume  of currency 
and  coin  that  was  transported  in  the  settlement 
process.  Moreover,  to  further  economize  on 
shipments  of  currency  and  coin,  clearinghouse 
members  kept  the  bulk  of their  reserves  in the  vaults 
of  the  clearinghouse,  receiving  in  return  claims  to 
their  reserves  known  as clearinghouse  certificates.22 
Then,  instead  of  shipping  currency  and  coin  to 
settle,  member  banks  could  simply  pass  around 
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at the  clearinghouse,  in turn,  facilitated  an interbank 
market  that  made  possible  a more  efficient  distribu- 
tion  of reserves  among  banks.  These  measures  all 
contributed  to  reducing  the  efficient  quantity  of 
reserves  that  banks  had  to hold.  By reducing  check- 
ing  fees,  they  also  encouraged  more  intensive  use 
of  checks  relative  to  currency  on  the  part  of  the 
public. 
Along with  the  set  of benefits  just  described,  clear- 
inghouses  eventually  provided  payments  finality.z3 
In the  absence  of finality,  a check  deposited  for col- 
lection  might  not  be  paid  if either  the  bank  against 
which  it was  written  failed  or  the  deposit  account 
against  which  it was  written  had  insufficient  funds. 
Obviously,  neither  the  paying  bank  nor  the  clear- 
inghouse  would  pay  a check  where  there  was  insuf- 
ficient  funds,  unless  the  drawer  of the  check  had  a 
prearranged  line  of  credit  at  his  bank.  But  with 
finality,  a check  deposited  for collection  in the  same 
town  was  given  immediate  credit.  In  other  words, 
finality  insured  the  check  depositor  against  failure  of 
the  paying  bank.  In  order  to  provide  finality,  clear- 
inghouse  member  banks  agreed  to assess  themselves 
if a  member  bank  failed  to  cover  its  position  with 
the  clearinghouse  later  that  day.  The  assessments 
were  then  used  to  pay  the  failing  bank’s  checks  in 
return  for a lien against  the receiver  of the failed bank. 
Making  use  of their  cooperative  nature,  then,  clear- 
inghouses  provided  a kind  of check  insurance  to the 
depositors  of their  member  banks.  If checks  could 
be  deposited  quickly,  finality  allowed  a  checks 
reliability  to  depend  entirely  on  the  individual  issu- 
ing it.  Hence,  finality  further  enhanced  the  conveni- 
ence  of  checks  as  means  of  payment. 
The  clearinghouse  represented  a highly  sophisti- 
cated  example  of efficiencies  in the  payments  system 
achieved  by substituting  private  credit  for commodity 
money.  The  uses  of private  credit  were  numerous. 
The  daily  clearing  and  collection  process  routinely 
generated  credit  against  the  clearinghouse.  Member 
banks  held  currency  and  coin  in its vault.  Extensive 
interbank  lending  and  borrowing  of  reserves  was 
carried  out  under  its auspices.  In addition,  the  clear- 
inghouse  managed  an important  contingent  liability 
in  the  form  of  mutual  insurance  of  checks  in  the 
process  of  collection. 
As  we  would  expect,  the  clearinghouse  imposed 
numerous  rules  and regulations  on its member  banks 
and engaged  in supervision  and  enforcement  as well. 
There  were  minimum  capital requirements.  Coin  and 
currency  reserves  at  the  clearinghouse  partly  col- 
lateralized  the  debit  positions  of  clearing  banks. 
There  were  relatively  frequent  examinations  of 
member  banks  by a clearinghouse  committee.  Clear- 
inghouses  also  reserved  the  right  to  exclude,  by 
vote,  members  shown  to  be  weak.24  The  threat  of 
expulsion  was  a powerful  management  tool  because 
public  expulsion  would  represent  an  adverse  signal 
to  depositors  and  cause  a bank  to  lose  the  ability  to 
have  its checks  accepted  for collection  at other  banks. 
It was  apparently  efficient  to restrict  membership  in 
the  clearinghouse  itself to a core  of well-managed  and 
highly  reliable  banks.  Other  banks  cleared  their 
checks  through  the  clearinghouse  by  retaining  a 
member  as an agent.  But clearinghouses  held  agents 
liable  for  checks  against  their  clients  authorized  for 
collection  through  clearinghouse  member  banks.25 
Thus  agents  were  given  a  powerful  incentive  to 
choose  and  monitor  their  client  banks  carefully. 




Previous  sections  explained  the  evolution  of  the 
payments  system  in  terms  of  the  efficiency  gains 
had  by  substituting  private  credit  for  commodity 
money  in the  settlement  process.  Two  insights  were 
stressed.  First,  the  shipping  and  inventory  costs  of 
settling  in commodity  money  could  be  significantly 
reduced  by  making  use  of  evermore  sophisticated 
borrowing  and  lending  arrangements.  Second,  these 
economies  had  to  be  purchased  by  setting  up  and 
managing  evermore  complicated  safeguards  to  pro- 
tect  the  institutional  lending  that  supported  the  effi- 
ciency  gains.  One  can  imagine  a payments  system 
not  in  need  of protection;  namely,  one  using  only 
government  currency  or coin,  i.e.,  cash,  and perhaps 
a postal  money-order  system.  With  the  proper  con- 
trols,  however,  users  of  payment  services  have 
apparently  been  willing  to  accept  some  credit  risk 
for  the  substantial  reduction  in costs  that  the  use  of 
credit  in place  of cash  has  afforded.  Here,  however, 
I explore  whether  the  development  of the  payments 
system  by  private  decentralized  competitive  forces 
was  deficient  from  the  macroeconomic  point  of view 
by  evaluating  three  prominent  public  payments 
system  policies:  monetary  policy,  central  bank 
lending,  and  deposit  insurance.*’ 
Monetary  Policy 
Monetary  policy  made  possible  two  distinct  effi- 
ciency  gains.  First,  national  paper  currency  re- 
placed  gold  coin  as  the  interregional  means  of 
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Reserve  to  create  currency  provided  better  protec- 
tion against  systemic  bank  runs.  I discuss  each  benefit 
in  turn. 
Prior  to  the  Civil  War,  interbank  balances  were 
settled  in gold  coin.  During  and  following  the  war, 
however,  the  national  government  created  paper  cur- 
rency  substitutes  for  gold  that  could  be  used  for 
settlement.  The  greenbacks,  unbacked  notes  issued 
during  the  war,  were  one  such  paper  currency.  Na- 
tional  bank  notes,  authorized  by  the  National  Bank 
Act  to  be  issued  by  banks  with  the  backing  of 
Treasury  bonds,  were  another.  The  Treasury  also 
issued  gold  and  silver  certificates,  which  were 
warehouse  receipts  for the  respective  metals  held  in 
the Treasury.  Because  these  currencies  were  liabilities 
of  the  national  Treasury,  they  were  accepted 
throughout  the  country.  Though  the  use  of gold  in 
the  settlement  process  had  been  greatly  reduced 
locally by clearinghouses,  the appearance  of Treasury 
currency  significantly  reduced  the  shipping  costs  of 
settlement  among  different  regions  of the  country.28 
The  Federal  Reserve  further  reduced  costs  by 
settling  interbank  balances  via book-entry  telegraphic 
messages  rather  than  by  physical  transportation  of 
gold or currency.  It is worth  noting  that  clearinghouse 
efficiencies  provided  by  the  Federal  Reserve  at the 
national  level might  have been  provided  privately  had 
interstate  banking  not  effectively  been  prohibited. 
At any rate,  management  of high-powered  money, 
i.e.,  currency  plus  bank  reserves,  by  the  Federal 
Reserve  after  1914  provided  another  important 
benefit  which  we  can  understand  as  follows.29  We 
have  interpreted  the  banking  system  together  with 
clearinghouses  as  a set  of credit  arrangements  that 
increased  the  efficiency  of commodity  money  in pro- 
viding  payments  services.  In  particular,  we  saw  in 
Section  III that  it was efficient  for checkable  deposits 
to  be  valued  at par  and  for banks  to  keep  fractional 
reserves.  Obviously,  a widespread  demand  to  con- 
vert  deposits  into  currency  could  not  be  satisfied  by 
such  a  system  without  a  central  bank.  The  clear- 
inghouses,  however,  could  protect  the  banking 
system  against  a run  by  temporarily  restricting  the 
conversion  of deposits  into  currency.  But restricting 
cash  payments  would  tend  to  cause  deposits  to 
depreciate  in terms  of currency.  Hence,  the  system 
was potentially  unstable.  Even  minor  banking  prob- 
lems  which  made  a restriction  possible  could  make 
forward-looking  depositors  seek  to  protect  them- 
selves  against  (or  profit  from)  a  potential  depreci- 
ation  by immediately  attempting  to convert  deposits 
into  currency.  In aggregate,  of course,  such  behavior 
could  make  a restriction  inevitable. 
In fact,  between  the  end  of the  Civil  War  and  the 
establishment  of  the  Federal  Reserve,  there  were 
numerous  banking  crises  which  involved  the  actual 
or expected  restriction  of the  conversion  of deposits 
into  currency.  Though  these  episodes  were  violent 
and  disruptive,  the  evidence  suggests  that  their  ag- 
gregate  insolvency  effects  were  relatively  small.30 In 
other  words,  the  pre-Fed  banking  crises  appear  to 
have  been  due  to  the  inherent  monetary  instability 
described  above. 
Being able to create  currency  through  open  market 
security  purchases,  Federal  Reserve  monetary  policy 
could  guarantee  the  exchange  rate  between  bank 
deposits  and  currency  against  systemwide  runs. 
Monetary  policy  is effective  in this  regard  precisely 
because  it protects  the  banking  system  by  creating 
the  currency  it needs,  so depositors  otherwise  con- 
fident  in the  solvency  of their  banks  need  not  worry 
about  a  depreciation  in  the  value  of  their  deposits 
in  terms  of  currency.  Hence,  with  a  central  bank 
“lender  of  last  resort,”  widespread  runs  need  not 
develop,  at least  in the  absence  of real  systemwide 
insolvencies.31  Hence,  monetary  policy  protects  the 
payments  system  in  a way  that  the  private  market 
cannot. 
Central  Bank Lending 
In  contrast  to  monetary  policy,  central  bank 
lending  involves  making  loans  to  individual  banks 
with funds  acquired  by selling off other  assets,  usually 
government  bonds.  In  other  words,  I  am  defining 
central  bank  lending  to be analogous  to private  finan- 
cial  intermediation  in  that  it  neither  creates  nor 
destroys  high-powered  money.  Obviously,  because 
it involves  making  loans,  central  bank  lending  must 
be  accompanied  by  provisions  to  monitor  and  en- 
force  compliance  with  certain  restrictions  on poten- 
tial borrowers.  In the  public  sector,  these  are known 
as  supervision  and  regulation. 
The  three  major  categories  of  Federal  Reserve 
lending  are all importantly  related  to payments  system 
policy.  Although  discount  window  credit  is  not 
generated  in the payments  system  proper,  it is valued 
in large part for the  assistance  it provides  to individual 
banks  in order  to protect  the  payments  system.32  In 
fact,  the  Fed’s  discount  window  is often  cited  as  a 
comparative  advantage  for Federal  Reserve  manage- 
ment  of the  payments  system.33  Daylight  overdrafts 
constitute  a second  category  of Fed  lending.  They 
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to depository  institutions  making  payments  over  Fed- 
wire,  the  Fed’s  electronic  funds  transfer  network.34 
Though  quantitatively  less  significant,  Federal 
Reserve  lending  also takes  the form of float generated 
in the process  of clearing  checks.35 I evaluate,  in turn, 
discount  window  lending  and  credit  extended  in the 
process  of  making  payments. 
While  open  market  operations  are  seen  as capable 
of handling  aggregate  monetary  conditions,  the  dis- 
count  window  is  valued  for  its  ability  to  direct 
potentially  large  quantities  of funds,  on  very  short 
notice,  to individually  troubled  banks.  No  one  argues 
that  the  discount  window  should  be  used  to  rescue 
insolvent  banks,  only  that  it be  used  to  aid tempo- 
rarily  illiquid  banks.  While  the  distinction  between 
the  two is crucial for evaluating  central  bank  discount 
window  lending  more  generally,  we  can  sidestep  it 
here.36  The  reason  is that,  in practice,  the  Federal 
Reserve  fully  collateralizes  its  discount  window 
lending.  Hence,  discount  window  lending  has  in- 
volved  little  risk  for the  Fed.  But what  then  explains 
the  widespread  use  of  discount  window  loans  by 
banks  in  trouble?  After  all,  private  lenders  should 
be  eager  to  lend  on  the  same  terms  as  the  Fed. 
Moreover,  the  Fed  does  not  appear  to  charge  a 
below-market  rate for its emergency  credit  assistance. 
The  answer  appears  to be that  banks  cannot  legally 
pledge  specific  assets  against  privately  borrowed 
funds,  i.e.,  private  lenders  cannot  perfect  a collateral 
interest  in specific  assets  of a borrowing  bank.  In case 
of  insolvency,  then,  private  lenders  must  become 
general  creditors.  Government  agencies,  however, 
such  as the  U.S.  Treasury  and the  Federal  Reserve, 
are  allowed  to perfect  a collateral  interest  in specific 
assets  of  a bank  to  which  they  lend  funds.37 
Discount  window  advances  may  be  secured  by  a 
wide  range  of  bank  assets.  The  riskier  and  less 
liquid  the  asset,  however,  the  greater  the  haircut  off 
book  value  that  the  Fed  will lend  on.  The  pledging 
of particular  assets  to borrow  funds  is similar,  in prin- 
ciple,  to  selling  them  for cash.  If the  need  for funds 
is expected  to be temporary,  however,  borrowing  on 
the  basis  of pledged  assets  is  more  economical.  It 
avoids  the greater  transaction  cost  of a sale,  including 
for loan  sales  the  cost  of restructuring  a loan  servic- 
ing relationship.  Hence,  borrowing  from  the  Fed  on 
pledged  assets  dominates  selling  those  assets. 
The  effect  of fully collateralized  discount  window 
lending,  then,  turns  on  the  pledging  rules.  If  the 
rules  were  the  same  for the  Fed  and  private  lenders, 
discount  window  lending  would  make  little difference, 
as long  as no  subsidy  were  involved  in Fed  lending. 
It  is beyond  the  scope  of this  paper  to  analyze  the 
socially  optimal  configuration  of pledging  rules.  But 
allowing  the  Fed  to select  good  collateral  to back  its 
loans  permits  weak  banks  to  more  cheaply  obtain 
funds  to continue  operating,  possibly  pledging  their 
best  collateral  at the  discount  window  to pay out unin- 
sured  depositors,  i.e.,  the  hot  money,  prior  to  a 
bank’s  being  closed.  Currently,  then,  the  discount 
window  can delay the  declaration  of insolvency,  while 
effectively  moving  uninsured  depositors  from  last  to 
first  in  line.  This,  of  course,  is  at  the  expense  of 
the  deposit  insurance  fund.  On  the  other  hand, 
under  current  pledging  rules  the  discount  window  is 
better  able  to  save  temporarily  illiquid  but  solvent 
banks  from  bankruptcy,  which  is  a  social  benefit. 
However,  if it  is  socially  efficient  for  the  Fed  to 
have  pledging  privileges,  shouldn’t  such  privileges 
be  given  to  private  lenders  as  well?  As  mentioned 
in Section  III, the  efficiency gains of fractional  reserve 
banking  could  not  be  had  unless  depositors  gave  up 
perfected  collateral  interest.  But couldn’t  private  bank 
debt  such  as certificates  of deposit  be  made  eligible 
for  perfected  collateral?  The  point  is that  whatever 
pledging  rule  is judged  to  be  socially  optimal,  it  is 
difficult to see why the Fed  and private  lenders  should 
not  both  be  subject  to  it,  in  which  case  unsubsi- 
dized  fully  collateralized  discount  window  lending 
would  make  little  difference. 
My  evaluation  of  Federal  Reserve  credit  ex- 
tended  in  the  process  of  making  payments  is  con- 
siderably  different  than  that  for  discount  window 
lending.  First  of  all,  daylight  overdrafts  and  float 
generated  in the  process  of making  payments  are not 
perfectly  collateralized  as are discount  window  loans. 
Moreover,  daylight  overdrafts  are conceptually  related 
to the  credit  generated  by clearinghouses  in connec- 
tion  with  the  provision  of finality as discussed  above. 
The  fact that  it was efficient for private  clearinghouses 
to  accept  the  generation  of  credit  in  that  regard 
suggests  that  some  portion  of daylight  overdrafts  may 
be efficient.  Since  it is essentially  feasible  for the  Fed 
to  monitor  reserve  accounts  electronically  on  a real 
time  basis,  it  would  also  be  feasible  to  eliminate 
daylight  overdrafts.  38  However,  to do so would  make 
it  costlier  for  banks  to  manage  their  reserve  flows 
during  the  day.  Banks  would  likely  respond  with  a 
combination  of  increased  use  of  correspondent 
balances  for  clearing  purposes,  increased  effort  to 
coordinate  inflows  and  outflows  of funds,  and  larger 
reserve  accounts.  So  daylight  overdrafts  should  be 
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proper  pricing  policy  and  the  absence  of subsidies. 
Of  course,  the  price  of  Federal  Reserve  credit 
generated  in the  payments  system  should  also cover 
the  cost  of the  supervisory  and  regulatory  controls 
that  the  Fed  must  administer  to protect  its loans.  In 
other  words,  the  Fed  should  be  careful  to  allocate 
such  management  costs  efficiently  as  well,  just  as 
private  clearinghouses  had  to  allocate  their  costs.  It 
has  been  said  that  the  Fed’s  discount  window  gives 
it an  advantage  in managing  the  payments  system. 
It  should  be  clear  that  this  makes  little  sense  given 
the way the Fed  runs the  discount  window.  However, 
if it is efficient  for a national  clearinghouse  to oversee 
the  payments  system,  it is efficient  for an institution 
like  the  Federal  Reserve  to  do  so.  In  the  absence 
of  restrictions  on  interstate  branching,  however,  a 
national  clearinghouse  might  easily  have  been 
organized  by  a group  of private  nationwide  banks.39 
On  the  basis  of this discussion,  one  can appreciate 
the  concerns  of some  policymakers  for maintaining 
a  separation  between  banking  on  one  hand,  and 
finance  and  commerce  on the  other,  and for limiting 
direct  access  to the  payments  system.40  The  separa- 
tion  of banking  from  finance  and  commerce  would 
maintain  a degree  of homogeneity  that would facilitate 
the  monitoring  and enforcement  of safeguards  in the 
interbank  credit  market.  Moreover,  as  mentioned 
above,  it  was  efficient  for  private  clearinghouses 
before  the  Fed  to  limit  their  membership  to  a rela- 
tively  exclusive  core  of banks,  allowing  other  banks 
access  to the  clearing  system  through  agent-member 
banks.  This  suggests  that  it is efficient  for  the  Fed 
to restrict  direct  access  to its national  clearing  system 
as well,  both  to protect  Fed  lending  generated  in the 
payments  system  and to protect  the  interbank  credit 
market.41 
Deposit  Insurance 
Deposit  insurance  is a promise  to  make  good  the 
value  of  covered  deposits,  in  return  for  a  bank’s 
assets,  in  the  event  of  a failure.  The  guarantee  is 
essentially  a  put  option  on  the  assets  of  the  bank 
that  gives  management  the  right  to  sell those  assets 
to  the  guarantor  for  the  value  of  the  covered 
deposits.  42 Because  deposit  insurance  is a potenti- 
ally  costly  contingent  liability  whose  value  is influ- 
enced  by  a  bank  manager’s  choice  of  assets,  the 
guarantor  must  protect  its  funds  by  monitoring  in- 
sured  banks  and  enforcing  restrictions  on  their 
behavior.  Uninsured  deposits  and  minimum  capital 
requirements  are  two  key  provisions  for  protecting 
the  deposit  insurer’s  funds.  The  discussion  of deposit 
insurance  below  points  out  some  pitfalls  of such  pro- 
visions.  It then  uses  insights  from  the  discussion  of 
private  payments  arrangements  to  suggest  a tough 
exclusion  principle  as a potential  remedy,  and  to cri- 
tique  an alternative  proposal,  narrow  banking.  First, 
however,  it points  out  a deficiency  in the  payments 
system  that  deposit  insurance  helps  to  correct. 
As  it  is  organized  in  the  United  States,  deposit 
insurance  is financed  by assessments  on participating 
banks.  Because  it  does  not  involve  the  creation  or 
destruction  of currency,  deposit  insurance  is neither 
necessary  nor sufficient to protect  the banking  system 
against  the  monetary  instabilities  described  above. 
It is not  designed,  as central  bank  lending  is, to pro- 
vide  line  of credit  assistance  to  temporarily  illiquid 
but  solvent  banks;  nor  does  deposit  insurance  have 
anything  to  do  with  providing  finality  in the  settle- 
ment  process. 
If  deposit  insurance  has  a  role,  it  is  a  means  of 
allowing  depositors  to  better  pool  the  risk  of  indi- 
vidual  bank  failures.  Individual  banks  have  an incen- 
tive  to  diversify  to  the  point  where  the  marginal 
benefit  is just  offset  by  the  higher  agency  costs  due 
to the  reduced  stake  in the  loans  originated.43  Non- 
traded  loan  portfolios  are most  efficiently  diversified 
among  those  institutions  specializing  in information- 
intensive  lending  themselves,  i.e.,  banks.  Branching 
is probably  the  most  important  means  of diversifica- 
tion,  though  interbank  deposits,  purchases  and  sales 
of loans,  and loan syndications  can provide  the  same 
benefits.  The  U.S.  political  system  has,  however, 
greatly  restricted  both  intra- and interstate  branching. 
The  risk pooling  made  possible  by deposit  insurance 
may  be useful  as a means  of diversifying  bank  assets 
in the  presence  of branching  restrictions.44  In other 
words,  deposit  insurance  may  be  viewed  as  over- 
coming  a deficiency  in the  payments  system.  The 
deficiency,  however,  arises not from  a private  market 
failure,  but  from  inefficient  political  interference  in 
the  market  for  corporate  control  in  banking.4s 
While  deposit  insurance  probably  substitutes  to 
some  extent  for diversification  through  free  branch- 
ing,  it is beyond  the  scope  of this  paper  to  say how 
well it does  so,  especially  relative  to the  alternatives 
mentioned  above.  It  is possible,  however,  to  point 
out  some  weaknesses  in the  means  of protecting  the 
insurance  fund  that  tend  to make  deposit  insurance 
inefficient.  Consider  uninsured  deposits.  These 
cushion  the  insurance  fund  by making  it more  likely 
that  bank  assets  will  cover  insured  deposits  in  the 
event  of  a failure.  In  practice,  however,  uninsured 
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reasons.  First,  as  we  saw  earlier,  discount  window 
lending  makes  it easier  for uninsured  deposits  to be 
withdrawn  from  a  weak  bank  before  it  becomes 
insolvent.  Second,  it is difficult  for  a public  author- 
ity  subject  to  political  pressure  to  successfully 
precommit  to  not  bailing  out  uninsured  depositors 
ex post,  especially  in large bank  insolvencies.  In prin- 
ciple,  bank  capital  also  provides  a  cushion  to  pro- 
tect  the  insurance  fund.  However,  without  the  power 
to  reorganize  or recapitalize  a weak  bank  before  its 
net  worth  goes  to  zero,  capital  cannot  provide  a 
reliable  cushion  either. 
Given  that  uninsured  deposits  and bank  capital  are 
unreliable  cushions,  an  attractive  alternative  sug- 
gested  by the  behavior  of the  pre-Fed  clearinghouses 
is  to  use  the  power  to  exclude.  The  insurer  could 
reserve  the  right  to exclude  a bank  from participating 
in  the  deposit  insurance  program  if its  capital  falls 
below  minimum  requirements,  or  if it is perceived 
to  be  weak  and  mismanaged.46  As was  the  case  for 
the  clearinghouses,  the  threat  of expulsion  would  be 
a powerful  disciplining  device  because  its announce- 
ment  would  represent  an  adverse  signal.  If society 
wished  to protect  the  depositors  of an expelled  bank, 
it could  offer  deposit  insurance  briefly  following  the 
announcement.  Such  a guarantee,  though,  would  re- 
quire  higher  minimum  capital  requirements  and 
tougher  participation  standards  to protect  the  insurer; 
but  it might  be necessary  to make  the  exclusion  prin- 
ciple politically  viable.  Roughly  speaking,  an efficient 
exclusion  rule  would  fix the  marginal  cost  of being 
tough  (the  compliance,  monitoring,  and  enforce- 
ment  costs)  at  the  point  where  it  equaled  the 
expected  marginal  utility  cost  of  claims  on  the 
insurer.  Such  a rule  could  leave  the  insurer  open  to 
some  risk,  though  it  would  provide  the  optimal 
degree  of  protection. 
A well-known  proposed  alternative  to  deposit  in- 
surance  is the  fail-safe,  or narrow,  bank.47 This  pro- 
posal involves  restricting  the  assets  backing  checkable 
deposits  to short-term  marketable  securities  with little 
chance  of declining  in value  due  to credit  or interest 
rate  risk.  One  might  imagine  the  Fed  imposing  such 
restrictions  on  banks  in  the  payments  system.  It 
appears  that  narrow  banking  could,  in principle,  pro- 
vide  near  perfect  protection  of the  payments  system 
with  relatively  little  monitoring  and  enforcement 
costs. 
It  would  do  so,  however,  by  destroying  the  effi- 
cient  joint  application  of information-intensive  lend- 
ing to payments  services  and loans,  reducing  the  rate 
banks  could  offer on checkable  deposits.  One  of the 
themes  of the  paper,  however,  is that  it has  always 
been  possible  for individuals  to employ  perfectly  safe 
means  of making  payments,  but  with proper  controls 
the  public  has  accepted  credit  risk  for the  reduction 
in cost  it has afforded.  Moreover,  since  narrow  bank- 
ing would  do nothing  to provide  a better  diversifica- 
tion  of nontraded  loans  to help  overcome  branching 
restrictions,  it should  not  be viewed  as an alternative 
means  of risk  pooling  or  insurance. 
Narrow  banking  would  protect  the  checkable 
deposit  guarantee  against  abuse  by  bank  managers. 
But checkable  deposits  are  only  a small  part  of total 
deposits,  and their  share  is likely to shrink  under  nar- 
row  banking  because  of the  lower  checkable  deposit 
interest  rate.  Unless  the  government  could  pre- 
commit  to  not  guaranteeing  other  deposits,  narrow 
banking  would  provide  only  marginal  protection 
against  abuses.  By  establishing  the  principle  that  a 
portion  of deposits  ought  to  be  perfectly  safe,  nar- 
row  banking  might  even  raise  the  expectation  of  a 
government  guarantee  for other  deposits.  Closing  the 
deposit  insurance  agencies  might  lower  expectations 
of such  a guarantee,  but  weakening  government  con- 
trols  on bank  asset  choice  could  lead  to more  severe 
problems  if  banks  continued  to  expect  such  a 
guarantee.  On  net,  narrow  banking  would  appear  to 
offer  little  relative  to  deposit  insurance  augmented 
with  a tough  exclusion  principle  as outlined  above. 
%JMMARY 
This  paper  has  analyzed  the  evolution  and  strut- 
ture  of the  key  components  of the  payments  system: 
currency,  the  banking  system,  clearinghouses,  the 
central  bank,  and  deposit  insurance.  It  began  by 
pointing  out  efficiencies,  such  as recognizability  and 
portability,  that  led particular  commodities  to be used 
as money.  It explained  the  evolution  of the payments 
system  as driven  by efficiency  gains from substituting 
credit,  i.e.,  claims  on particular  institutions,  for com- 
modity  money.  Two  insights  were  stressed.  Ship- 
ping  and  inventory  costs  of  settling  in  commodity 
money  were  significantly  reduced  by  making  use  of 
evermore  sophisticated  borrowing  and  lending  ar- 
rangements.  These  economies  were  accompanied  by 
evermore  elaborate  safeguards  to  protect  the  insti- 
tutional  lending  that  supported  the  efficiency  gains. 
Fractional  reserve  banking,  banknotes,  demand 
deposits,  and  checks  were  all explained  as  econo- 
mizing  on  the  use  of  commodity  money.  Systems 
to  evaluate  credit,  monitor  and  enforce  loan 
agreements,  and  extend  credit  on  short  notice  are 
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borrowers  and  in  managing  lending  to  support  an 
efficient  provision  of  payments  services.  This,  I 
argued,  explains  why  it  has  been  efficient  for  pay- 
ment  services  and  information-intensive  loans  to be 
provided  by the  same  set  of institutions,  i.e.,  banks. 
In addition,  I pointed  out  that  institutions  specializ- 
ing  in  nontraded  loans  could  not  be  run  efficiently 
as mutual  funds.  Par  value  deposits,  like bonds,  are 
an  optimal  part  of a financial  package  to  most  effi- 
ciently  monitor  management  and  ensure  an efficient 
choice  of assets.  Hence,  this  argument  also explains 
that  bank  deposits  have  been  par  valued  because  it 
has  been  efficient  to  use  them  to  fund  nontraded 
loans. 
The  paper  also discussed  the  Suffolk  System  and 
the  check  clearinghouses,  two  multilateral  arrange- 
ments  to  further  economize  on  the  provision  of 
payments  services.  They  introduced  centralized  col- 
lection,  collective  net  settlement,  centralized  holding 
of reserves,  more  extensive  interbank  lending,  and 
payments  finality.  All  involved  more  sophisticated 
uses  of  private  credit  to  reduce  payments  costs. 
Consequently,  the  cooperative  organizations  imposed 
numerous  rules  and  regulations  on  members  and 
engaged  in  extensive  supervision  as  well.  For  ex- 
ample,  there  were  capital  requirements  and frequent 
examinations  of member  banks.  Equally  important 
was the  power  to exclude,  by vote,  a member  shown 
to  be  weak.  The  private  cooperative  arrangements 
are particularly  interesting  because  they  represent  the 
middle  ground  between  an  entirely  decentralized 
payments  system  and  one  dominated  by  public 
authority.  Hence,  they  provide  examples,  for  com- 
parison  with  actual  and  proposed  public  policies,  of 
cooperative  arrangements  driven  by efficiency  rather 
than  political  concerns. 
In  the  last  part  of  the  paper  I  focused  on  the 
possible  need  for  public  policies  to  protect  the 
payments  system.  To  repeat,  it  has  always  been 
possible  to make  payments  safely with cash,  but  users 
of  payments  services  have  been  willing  to  accept 
some  risk  for the  benefits  that  private  credit  in place 
of commodity  money  has  afforded.  However,  I ex- 
plored  whether  the  private  development  of  the 
payments  system  was  deficient  by  evaluating 
monetary  policy,  central  bank  lending,  and  deposit 
insurance  in  light  of  the  earlier  analysis. 
Two  features  of efficient  private  bank  structure, 
namely,  par  value  deposits  and  fractional  reserves, 
implied  a useful  role  for  monetary  policy  to protect 
the  payments  system.  The  clearinghouses  protected 
the  banking  system  against  widespread  runs  by tem- 
porarily  restricting  the  conversion  of  deposits  into 
currency.  But  currency  restrictions  were  disruptive 
and  the  possibility  of  their  use  increased  the 
likelihood  of widespread  runs  themselves.  Monetary 
policy  was  useful  in this  regard  because  it could,  by 
creating  the  needed  currency,  protect  the  banking 
system  against  such  disruptions. 
In  contrast  to  monetary  policy,  central  bank 
lending  neither  creates  nor  destroys  high-powered 
money.  It involves  making  loans  to individual  banks 
with  funds  acquired  by  selling  government  bonds. 
I pointed  out  that  private  credit  markets  would  be 
willing  and  able  to  provide  emergency  credit  assist- 
ance  on the  same  fully collateralized  terms  as the  Fed 
discount  window.  Pledging  rules  explain  the  use  of 
Fed  emergency  credit  assistance.  The  efficiency gains 
of fractional  reserve  banking  could  not  be had unless 
depositors  gave  up perfected  collateral  interest.  This 
is reflected  in the fact that banks  cannot  legally pledge 
specific  assets  against  privately  borrowed  funds.  The 
Fed’s  advantage  is that  it is allowed  to perfect  a col- 
lateral  interest.  I  briefly  considered  altering  the 
pledging  rules.  But  whatever  rule  is judged  to  be 
socially  optimal,  it is difficult to see why  the  Fed  and 
private  lenders  should  not  both  be  subject  to  it,  in 
which  case  unsubsidized  fully collateralized  discount 
window  lending  would  make  little  difference. 
The  Federal  Reserve  also  extends  loans,  most 
importantly,  as daylight  overdrafts,  in the  process  of 
making  payments.  Such  loans  are  not  perfectly  col- 
lateralized  as  is  discount  window  credit.  Daylight 
overdrafts  are  conceptually  analogous  to  the  credit 
generated  by  private  clearinghouses  in  connection 
with  the  provision  of finality.  Hence,  some  portion 
of Fed  daylight  overdrafts  may be efficient.  Likewise, 
it was efficient for private  clearinghouses  to limit their 
membership  to an exclusive  core  of banks,  with other 
banks  accessing  the  clearing  system  through  agent- 
member  banks.  This  suggests  that  it is efficient  for 
the  Fed  to restrict  direct  access  to its national  clear- 
ing system  as well,  to protect  Fed  daylight  overdrafts 
and  the  interbank  credit  market. 
Deposit  insurance  was  the  last  public  payments 
system  policy  to  be  evaluated.  I  interpreted  such 
insurance  literally  as  a  means  of  allowing  bank 
depositors  to  pool  the  risk  of  individual  bank 
failures,  not  as  a  means  of  protecting  the  banking 
system  against aggregate  shocks.  I argued  that  deposit 
insurance  could be viewed  as overcoming  a deficiency 
in  the  payments  system.  But  the  deficiency  arose 
because  intra-  and interstate  branching,  which  is one 
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loans,  has  been  greatly  inhibited  by  the  political 
system.  I also  pointed  out  some  weaknesses  in the 
use  of uninsured  deposits  and bank  capital  as means 
of protecting  the  insurance  fund.  Current  pledging 
rules  and  discount  window  lending  policy  make  it 
easier  for  uninsured  deposits  to  be  withdrawn  from 
a  weak  bank  before  it  is  declared  insolvent.  It  is 
also  difficult  for  public  authority  not  to  bail  out 
uninsured  depositors  ex post.  Likewise,  without  the 
power  to  reorganize  or  recapitalize  a  weak  bank 
before  its net  worth  goes  to zero,  capital  cannot  pro- 
vide  a  reliable  cushion  either. 
In light  of this  point,  I discussed  the  narrow  bank 
proposal  as  a  substitute  for  deposit  insurance.  My 
feeling,  though,  is  that  narrow  banking  would  be 
unnecessarily  costly  because  it  would  destroy  the 
efficient  joint  application  of  information-intensive 
lending  to  the  production  of payments  services  and 
loans.  Moreover,  narrow  banking  would  do nothing 
to  provide  a  better  diversification  of  loans.  Lifting 
branching  restrictions  would  best  do  that.  Most 
importantly,  although  it would  protect  the  checkable 
deposit  guarantee  from abuse  by bank  managers,  nar- 
row banking  would  not protect  any additional  deposit 
guarantee  such  as might  be  difficult  to  avoid  in the 
event  of  a  large  bank  failure. 
On  the  basis  of the  behavior  of the  pre-Fed  clear- 
inghouses,  I argued  that  a tough  exclusion  principle 
would  provide  an  attractive  alternative  to  narrow 
banking.  Banks  could  continue  to fund  information- 
intensive  loans  with  checkable  deposits,  but  the  in- 
surance  agency  could  expel  a weak  or  mismanaged 
bank,  or one  whose  capital  fell below  a minimum  re- 
quirement.  The  agency  could  even  refuse  to  insure 
a  bank  too  large  or  insufficiently  diversified  to 
handle  safely.  If society  wished  to protect  depositors 
whose  bank  was expelled,  it could  do so by requiring 
sufficiently  high  minimum  capital  requirements  and 











See  Lucas  [1980],  McCallum  119833, and Townsend  [1980] 
for recent  theoretical  work  motivating  and  emphasizing  the 
medium  of  exchange  role  of  money. 
Jevons  [ 18751 contains  excellent  descriptive  and  analytical 
material  on  the  evolution  of  the  payments  system. 
King  and  Plosser  I19861  focus  on  this  point. 
See  Townsend  11980 and  19861, and  references  contained 
therein,  for  theoretical  analyses  of  these  issues. 
Humphrey  119841, p.  6,  reports  about  70  percent  of  all 
transactions  as  taking  place  with  cash,  though  by  value 
cash  transactions  account  for  only  about  1.5  percent  of 
the  total. 
Fama  [1980]  and  McCallum  [198.5] discuss  the  possi- 
bility  of an accounting  system  of exchange  without  money. 
See  also  de  Roover  119793 and  Usher  119671 on  the  early 
evolution  of  banking. 
Richards  (19291  contains  a  good  discussion  of goldsmith 
bankers  and  the  evolution  of  English  paper  money. 
The  fact  that  a warehouse  could  charge  a storage  fee,  i.e., 
pay  a  negative  rate  of  interest,  does  not  diminish  the 
usefulness  of  the  analogy. 
Boyd  and  Prescott  [ 19861, Smith  and  Warner  [ 19791, and 
Watts  and  Zimmerman  [ 19831 contain  excellent  discussions 
of  these  issues. 
See  the  discussion  in Jensen  and  Meckling  [ 19761, section 
4.2. 
ENDNOTES 
10.  An  important  exception,  of  course,  was  the  temporarily 
fluctuating  currency  price  of  deposits  that  resulted  from 
the  restriction  on  cash  payments  during  the  pre-Fed 
banking  crises.  See  Friedman  and  Schwartz  [ 19631. Private 
banknotes  and  non-par  checks  could  circulate  at a discount. 
However,  when  presented  in  person  at  the  bank  upon 
which  they  were  drawn,  they  were  paid  at  par. 
11.  Fama  [ 19851 contains  a nice  discussion  of this  view  of bank 
lending.  See  Goodhart  ] 19873 and James  ] 19871 for further 
discussion  of  this  point. 
12.  See  Gorton  and  Haubrich  [ 19871 for a discussion  and  inter- 
pretation  of  the  recent  rise  in  loan  sales. 
13.  Williams  [1984]  makes  this  point  with  regard  to  grain 
banking. 
14.  Since  a check  represents  a personal  promise  to  pay  cash 
in the  future,  its  acceptability  requires  a means  of judging 
the  reliability  of the  writer.  Hence,  checks  are  used  when 
reliability  is assured,  such  as for repeated  purchases  at  the 
same  firm,  e.g.,  for  rent  or  for  the  purchase  of groceries. 
15.  It  is worth  noting  that  the  use  of trade  credit  among  non- 
banks  is analogous  to the  use  of interbank  balances  among 
banks. 
16.  Lindow  [  19631 reports  a ratio  of total  bank  capital  (equity, 
loan  loss  reserves,  and  subordinated  debt)  to  risk  assets 
(total  assets  less  cash  and  U.S.  Treasury  securities)  from 
1863  to  1963.  The  ratio  falls  from  60 ‘percent  in  1880, 
to  about  20  percent  at  the  turn  of  the  century,  to  under 
10 percent  by  the  1960s. 


















Strictly  speaking,  this  argument  explains  only  why  bank 
deposits  are  par  valued.  It  does  not  explain  why  they 
are valued  in nominal  units  and  not,  for example,  indexed 
to  the  price  level.  Perhaps  it is because  banks  evolved  as 
commodity  money  warehouses.  In any case,  this  is a more 
general  question  which  is beyond  the  scope  of this  paper 
to  address. 
See  Whitney  [1878]. 
Mullineaux  [1987],  p.  890. 
Cannon  [ 191 l] and  Spahr  [ 19261 contain  good  institutional 
histories  of  check  clearing. 
Financial  center  banks,  having  numerous  correspondent 
relationships  with  country  banks,  also  provided  check 
collection  economies  similar  to  those  provided  by  the 
Suffolk  System  for  note  redemptions. 
Westerfield  [ 19211,  pp.  634-39. 
The  Constitution  of the Nm  York Clearing/rouse  AcroLation 
[1903],  Section  13,  p.  9. 
For  example,  T/re Constitution  of the New York Clearinghouse 
Astitian  [  19031, Section  20, p.  13, provided  for expulsion 
of  a  member  by  majority  vote. 
See,  for example,  The Constitution  of the Nm  York Clearing- 
/rouse  Association [1903],  Section  25,  pp.  14-15. 
Gorton  and  Mullineaux  119871,  and  Timberlake  119843 
emphasize  the  private  regulatory  and  supervisory  nature 
of  clearinghouses. 
For  alternative  discussions  of policy  issues,  see  Eisenbeis 
[1987],  Heurtas  (19873,  and  Ireland  119873. 
See  Garbade  and  Silber  [1979]. 
See  Goodfriend  [1987]  for  a  discussion  of  the  efficiency 
gains,  feasibility,  and  mechanics  of central  banking  under 
a gold  standard. 
Benston,  et  al.  [1986],  pp.  53-60,  and  Goodfriend  and 
King  [ 19883,  make  this  point. 
Goodfriend  and  King  [1988]  emphasize  that  last  resort 
lending  is  monetary  policy.  It  is  effective  because  the 
provision  of  high-powered  money  can  prevent  nominal 
interest  rate  increases  and  asset  price  declines  from 
making  the  banking  system  insolvent. 
For example,  Continental  Illiiois  Bank borrowed  extensively 
at  the  Fed  discount  window  from  May  1984  to  February 
1985.  It  was  in  the  window  for  over  4  billion  dollars 
during  much  of that  time.  See  Benston,  et  al.  [ 19861, pp. 
120-24. 
See,  for  example,  Flannery  [1988]. 
Mengle,  Humphrey,  and  Summers  [1987],  p.  12, reported 
total  funds  transfer  daylight  overdrafts  of 76 billion  dollars 
per  day.  This  is an enormous  number  when  one  considers 
that  total  reserve  balances  with  Reserve  Banks  were  then 
around  35  billion  dollars.  Daylight  overdrafts  are currently 
not priced,  though  plans  are now in place  to do so by  1992. 
Overdrafts  are  interest  free  loans.  Therefore,  depository 
institutions  have  little  incentive  to  economize  on  their 
use.  To  limit  somewhat  the  use  of intraday  credit  the  Fed 
monitors  depository  institutions  according  to  “caps”  and 
relatively  informal  guidelines,  resorting  to  consultations 
with  bank  officials  when  necessary. 
35.  The  Monetary  Control  Act  of  1980  directed  that  Federal 
Reserve  check  float  be  priced  at  the  federal  funds  rate. 
Hence,  Fed  check  float  has  fallen  from  7.4  billion  dollars 
in  the  first  half  of  1979  to  under  1 billion  dollars  today. 
See  “Tug-of-War  Over  Float,”  [1983],  U.S.  Congress,  Th 
Role of the Federal Resew  in Check Cleating  and tke Nation’s 
Payments  System 119833,  and  Young  [1986]. 
36.  Goodfriend  and  King  (19881  evaluate  the  feasibility  and 
desirability  of  discount  window  lending  to  illiquid  but 
solvent  banks. 
37.  See Anztian.lbipn&nce  [1963],  Vol.  10, pp.  390-401  for 
the  banking  law  on  the  pledging  of  bank  assets. 
The  ability  of depository  institutions  to  use  repurchase 
agreements  (RPs)  as  a funding  instrument  is  a  breach  in 
the  pledging  prohibition  for  private  lenders.  Using  RPs, 
legally  characterized  as a sale  and  repurchase  of securities, 
effectively  allows  a  depository  institution  to  give  private 
lenders  a  collateral  interest  in  the  RPd  securities.  Bank 
use  of  RPs  is limited  by  a  1969  Federal  Reserve  rule  re- 
stricting  RP  collateral  to  direct  obligations  of  the  United 
States  or  its  agencies.  This  restriction  precludes  a signifi- 
cant  role  for private  emergency  credit  assistance  to  banks 
based  on  RPs. 
Thrifts  borrow  on a secured  basis  using  RPs,  mortgage- 
backed  bonds,  and  Federal  Home  Loan  Bank  advances. 
The  1980  Monetary  Control  Act  also  gives  thrifts  access 
to  the  Federal  Reserve’s  discount  window.  Thrifts, 
however,  have  had  little  need  for  the  Fed’s  discount 
window  given  the  other  means  of collateralized  borrowing 
available  to  them. 
38.  The  new  Swiss  Interbank  Clearing  System  instituted  in 
January  1988  has  done  so,  at  least  for  non-security 
transactions. 
39.  For  example,  a  national  clearinghouse  run  by  private 
banks  was  established  in  Canada  around  the  turn  of  the 
century,  well  before  the  Canadian  central  bank  was 
founded  in  1935. 
40. 
41. 
See  Corrigan  [ 19873. 
Goodfriend  and  Whelpley  11987)  document  the  Fed’s 
regulatory  role  in  the  evolution  of  the  federal  funds 
market. 
42.  See  Merton  (19771. 
Prior  to  passage  of  the  Financial  Institution  Reform, 
Recovery,  and  Enforcement  Act  of  1989  (FIRREA),  it 
was unclear  whether  the  deposit  insurance  agencies  would 
respect  a  collateral  interest  for  RP  lenders.  Such  uncer- 
tainty  has  been  greatly  reduced  under  FIRREA.  FIRREA 
(Sec.  212)  views  an  RP  as  a “qualified  financial  contract” 
and  states  that  no  person  shall  be  stayed  or  prohibited 
from  exercising  his  right  to  liquidate  RP  collateral.  Thus, 
the  way  is cleared  for greater  private  RP-based  emergency 
credit  assistance  to  thrifts. 
Uninsured  creditors  of  thrifts  have  shifted  out  of 
deposits  and  into  RPs  as  such  institutions  have  become 
troubled.  Below,  the  article  emphasizes  that  the  Fed 
discount  window  allows  uninsured  depositors  to  move 
from  last  to  first  in  line.  In  the  case  of  troubled  thrifts, 
however,  RPs  and  FHLB  advances,  rather  than  discount 
window  loans,  have  facilitated  this  process. 
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and  bonding  a  set  of  contracts  among  agents  with  con- 
flicting  interests,  plus  the  residual  loss  incurred  because 
the  cost  of  full  enforcement  of  contracts  exceeds  the 
benefits.  See  Jensen  and  Meckling  119761, pp.  306-10. 
44.  For  a  related  discussion  see  Brickley  and  James  11987). 
Although  nationwide  branch  banks  would  be  diversified 
against  local  risks,  as Edwards  [ 19881 argues,  hundreds  of 
smaller  banks  would  remain  viable  in a deregulated  system. 
The  large  diversified  banks,  however,  would  be positioned 
to  provide  small  bank  depositors  with  private  insurance, 
either  directly  or  through  loan  syndications. 
It  must  be  emphasized,  however,  that  branching  and 
deposit  insurance  only  yield  benefits  associated  with 
diversification  and  risk  pooling.  Neither  is  capable  of 
protecting  against  aggregate  shocks.  As  discussed  in 
Section  V,  aggregate  monetary  shocks  must  be  addressed 
with  monetary  policy.  As  Goodfriend  and  King  [1988] 
emphasize,  protection  of  the  banking  system  against 
aggregate  real  shocks  must  be  in  terms  of  a  tax  and 
transfer  fiscal  policy. 
45.  White  [1981]  provides  evidence  at  the  state  level  that 
deposit  insurance  was  seen  as  a  substitute  for  branching. 
46.  This  suggestion  is  very  close  in  spirit  to  that  advocated 
in Benston  and  Kaufman  [ 19881. See  Stelzer  [ 198 l] for an 
interesting  discussion  of  the  antitrust  implications  of 
exclusion. 
47.  See,  for  example,  Litan  119861. 
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